Examples of Satire in Adventures of Huckfinn Essay

Example 1: The first example of satire is from chapter 16 when a homeowner sees Jim and thinks that he is an intruder and sends his dogs on to him, then as soon as he realizes that Huck is with him he calls them off, this is a form of satire because it is funny because people often do that to people depending on their race, as in racial profiling. For example if he had seen Huck first he may not have sent his dogs onto them. Example 2: The second example of satire is from chapter 17, when Huck stays with the Grangerfords in this chapter they mention how much they hate the Shepherdson’s; this may be a satire about how much society hates God’s children, because Jesus is our shepherd and Christians are His children therefore making all Christians the Shepherd’s children. Although not all of society hates Christians, it has become politically correct to not be a Christian for some reason and in our public schools they are teaching everyone but Christianity and that almost reflects Huck’s situation. Example 3: Shortly after that someone tries to shoot Harney, but misses, they may be a satire of how when Jews tried to killed Jesus they failed in doing so. Example 4: The only clear satire in chapter 20 is that how the Duke and the King are more concerned about how they are going to catch Jim, the run-away slave, and not concerned about the man who is robbing every one of their money. This is a satire to about how our government today is more worried about video piracy and not other very important matters. Example 5: This last satire was not written to apply to this matter but it fits perfectly, in chapter 22 the Duck and Dauphin finally put on their show after a long time of planning and work and choreography, but only 12 people tend the show, this may be a satire example of Obama Care, and how Obama spent so much money and time to produce it but when it was actually released less people signed up for it than people signed the petition to revoke Justin Bieber. Modern Day Examples Example 1: This picture illustrated that our generation uses electronics too much and that even people go to the park they still just sit and use social media or play games on their electronics instead of using the park for what it was built for. (See Picture 1) Example 2: This example if of Obama trying to outlaw guns even though they are basically the only thing keeping him alive, and he doesn’t even realize that outlaws, the ones who are killing people are going to get guns anyways because they are outlaws for crying out loud, they don’t obey the law. (See Picture 2)

Congestive Heart Failure

Congestive heart failure, also called CHF or heart failure, is a serious and complex disease in which the heart muscle has been damaged or has to work too hard because of heart disease and other conditions, such as obesity. Although the heart continues to beat, the damaged heart muscle is too weak to efficiently pump enough oxygen-rich blood to and from the body, resulting in potentially life-threatening congestion in the lungs and other tissues of the body. Congestive heart failure is a common complication of heart attack and other types of heart disease that damage the heart muscle. These diseases include hypertension, heart valve disorders, arrhythmias, and cardiomyopathy. Congestive heart failure can also be caused by anemia. In general, congestive heart failure affects both the left and right sides of the heart, but it can affect one side more than the other, depending on the location and severity of damage. In left-sided congestive heart failure, the left side of the heart is damaged and unable to effectively pump blood from the heart to the body. This results in blood backing up into the lungs and increasing blood pressure in the lungs. The increase in pressure causes a buildup of fluid in the lungs, which can lead to a life-threatening condition called acute pulmonary edema. In right-sided congestive heart failure, the right side of the heart is damaged and unable to effectively pump blood flowing from the body back to the heart. This results in a backup of blood and an increase in pressure in the veins that carry blood from the body to the heart. In turn, this leads to swelling (edema) of the lower extremities and sometimes of other areas of the body. Acute congestive heart failure, in which fluid builds up rapidly in the lungs and causes pulmonary edema, is an immediately life-threatening condition that can quickly lead to respiratory failure, cardiac arrest and death. Immediate emergency treatment best minimizes the risk of these and other serious†¦

Applying to the Ivy League: Everything You Need to Know

Applying to college is no simple task, no matter where you apply, but for students applying to the prestigious Ivy League, the challenge is even greater. With acceptance rates consistently dipping below 10% and college applicants on the rise, getting into the Ivy League is a goal that most can only dream about. At , we have coached hundreds of students towards their Ivy League acceptances. In fact, we even helped one amazing student gain acceptance to seven of them! But what’s success if we aren’t willing to share it? Here, we provide a home for our top Ivy League tips. To learn more about the Ivy League and how you can score an acceptance too, take a look at the resources below. The term Ivy League actually refers to a collegiate athletic conference composed of sports teams from eight private colleges and universities in the northeastern United States. Though the term officially refers to an athletic conference, it is more commonly used to refer to these same eight schools in other contexts. Ivy League schools are generally known for their academic excellence and their extreme selectivity in admissions. The eight Ivy League schools are: Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard University, the University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, and Yale University. To learn more about some of these schools and what they’re all about, check out these posts: The Ivy League is exceptionally difficult to get into, especially by today’s increasingly selective college admissions standards. To learn more about the standards expected by the Ivy League, check out these posts about Ivy League students: Before you apply to any colleges, you’ll want to learn as much about them as possible. This can be through campus visits, interviews, college rankings, summer programs, or other avenues. To get started learning more about the Ivy League, have a look through these posts: Estimating your chance of getting into a college is not easy in today’s competitive environment. Thankfully, with our state-of-the-art software and data, we can analyze your academic and extracurricular profile and estimate your chances. Our profile analysis tool can also help you identify the improvement you need to make to enter your dream school. As is the case with any school you apply to, you’ll need to be sure that your high school classes and extracurriculars qualify you for acceptance. To learn how you can prepare for the Ivy League in high school, check out these posts: Although the overall trend in Ivy admissions places less emphasis on test scores than it did in previous years (thanks in large part to Harvard’s Making Caring Common initiative ), your scores are still important. To learn how they factor into Ivy League admissions, check out these posts: Are you college applications signed, sealed, and delivered? Now you wait. For many students this is the hardest part of the process. Waiting and receiving college decisions can be stressful. Here are some tips to help along the way: If you are a high school student interested in attending an Ivy League school, but you’re unsure if you have what it takes or you would like some help to ensure that you present the strongest application possible, consider ’ s Mentorship Program . This program provides practical advice on topics from college admissions to career aspirations, all from successful college students who have been in your shoes.

Browning ordinary men Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Browning ordinary men - Essay Example According to the morals of the society, execution of mass murder by soldiers is an inhumane act that erodes morals accorded to life and its significance. The reason of committing the mass murder by the help of the soldiers is Germany was to uphold Germany’s superiority against other races (Browning 16). The soldiers that carried out this particular mass murder also demonstrated lack of humanity to the innocent Jews. Thousands of the recruited police and soldiers armed with ammunition surrounded the unarmed Jews with the intention only to kill them hardheartedly (Browning 6). In addition, the armed soldiers and police officers shoot the unarmed Jews with intent to kill in ravines, ditches and forests. Hence, soldiers as the perpetrators of the mass murder depicts how one during their time would turn to be influential such that he could dictate the existence of other especially the Jews who were the victims of the day. Consequently, this power and influential status of the soldi ers prompted them to commit atrocities. One of the significant aspects that transformed soldiers to merciless killers was their respective psychological transformations dictated by circumstances, which they were in during then. Respective psychological transformations experienced by soldiers compelled them to unleash torture as well as exterminate innocent and helpless Jews (Browning 171). Transformation in this case implies abrupt change due to circumstance from being or behaving like an ordinary man to individuals who are merciless and ready to participate in committing serious historical crimes against humanity, which is by killing the defenceless through shooting as they did to Jews. The perpetrators of the German holocaust showed a sense of loyalty and obedience to their government. Each perpetrator was a subject to the ruling government under the Nazi

Suez Crisis Term Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

Suez Crisis - Term Paper Example Ever since the proposal of the Suez Canal was suggested, controversy broke out among key nations. The canal offered an important strategic advantage which was recognized by many different powers. The assignment will focus on the construction and opening of the canal in order to better understand its importance in the modern world. The factors which contributed to the beginning of the Crisis will also be examined. The Crisis itself will be explored with its complex political goings on and brutal military action. The assignment will also take a look at how and why the Crisis ended. Finally, the aftermath of the Crisis will be examined and assessed in order to see how it affected the countries involved and their future relations. 2. THE SUEZ CANAL The Suez Canal was opened on 17 November 1869; there by, creating a water way between Africa and Asia; for, it allowed ships to sail directly between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The canal was 160 km [101 miles] long and 296m at its narrowest point. [New World Encyclopedia Contributors, 2008] Although, Napoleon had entertained ideas of opening such a canal, it was Ferdinand de Lesseps, a French diplomat who put the dream into motion for a linking water way which would be accessible to ships of all nations. He presented his idea to Egypt and in 1854 the Viceroy of Egypt, Mohammed Said Pasha, agreed upon the construction of the Suez Canal. A prospectus was circulated among the leading nations of the time in order to promote the idea of the canal and to find investors to sponsor the construction. This lead to the formation of the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal on 20 December 1858. Due, to rivalry between France and Britain during this time, Britain was loth for France to extend its power in the region where the canal was to be constructed. Therefore, Britain refused to invest in the canal and campaigned against its construction. This led to a lack in foreign investors; thus, it was that Egypt receiv ed 44% in shares of the canal. Construction on the canal was finally begun on 25 April 18599. [British Broadcasting Corporation, 2009] It has been reported that the French employed forced labor from Egypt to construct the canal. Britain used this leverage to disrupt work on the canal by insighting unrest among the workers. It has been estimated that over 30 thousand Egyptians and 1.5 million foreigners helped in the construction of the canal. Due, to the hard working conditions over 120 thousand laborers died. [NWEC, 2008] The construction of the canal cost almost double the original estimate, totaling $100 million, making it $1 million per mile. France conducted the tariffs which were to be paid by vessels travelling on the canal. [Penfield, 1907 p7] It is ironic that three quarters of the traffic of the canal during the first year was made up of British vessels transporting goods to and from their colonial territories as well as transporting military and administrative personnel m ore quickly to Africa; thus, aiding Britain in the expansion of its colonies. [New World Encyclopedia, 2008] It took only 14 to 16 hours to traverse the canal. The canal shortened the route from Britain to Bombay in India from 10,860 miles to just over 4,600 miles. [Penfield, 1907 p15] Egypt’s Viceroy, Said Pasha, died before the completion of the canal and was succeeded by his nephew, Ismail Pasha. He was an ambitious man who

The gender is a key variable in international relations Essay

The gender is a key variable in international relations - Essay Example In this essay, I have discussed gender relations from various perspectives to highlight its position within international relations. The answer to whether gender remains a key variable in international relations studies seems to be contentious. Various issues are discussed here including the interrelations between gender and politics, gender and social norms and gender and industrial changes. Trade, political agenda, and social policies are shaped and controlled not just by a non-gendered approach to international relations but also by including factors of race and gender in developing these approaches. The analysis definitely points to a single all-important factor in the study of gender in international relations, namely the influence of feminism. Feminist and women’s movements have developed in parallel with changes in the study of international relations and have transformed the way social rules and political changes are defined or analyzed. Several aspects of the feminist approach are discussed here including health, scientific management, political inclusion, incarceration, workplace equality, trade relations and women’s human rights. The studies suggest that gender issues have awareness of the discriminatory practice at the workplace, in the classroom, in political scenarios, social meetings and in the wide international contexts. Gender issues have permeated all aspects of society and are subsequently the main variables that define wide social transformations along with race and class. Considering the range of issues that seem to be affected by gender considerations and the tremendous influence of feminism in highlighting a gendered view of social systems, the acknowledged masculinities in social realms seem to have been replaced by a greater realization for women’s rights and gender equality patterns in all aspects of international relations.

Challenges and Choices of HR Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2500 words - 1

Challenges and Choices of HR - Essay Example Following this, the report will entail a discussion of the importance of Job design in an organization and the main challenges that are faced by the human resources managers in this regard. Job Design plays a very important role in every job. This mainly deals with making work arrangements to ensure that the job dissatisfaction is reduced to the maximum extent. The main aim of a job design is to reduce the dissatisfaction due to repetitive and mechanistic tasks. Organizations use this to raise productivity levels among the employees. This is mainly achieved by offering nonmonetary rewards like better and higher levels of satisfaction that employees can achieve (Pearson, 2008). Other techniques like enlargement, job enrichment, job rotation and job simplification also form a part of the job design process. Having understood the main aims of job design, let us now focus on the objective of job design. It is clear that there are a number of design options that are available for any job. Thus it is important to understand what the main objectives are for any job design. Firstly, quality plays a very important role and is one of the most important aspects to be considered while designing a job. Quality refers to the ability of the staff to produce high-quality products and services and this can be affected majorly by the job design. This also includes avoiding of errors in short-term and also includes the designing of jobs which help encourage staff to improve the job and processes and also make lesser errors. Secondly, speed also plays an essential role in job design. The speed of response is the dominant objective of job design. It is essential that jobs consider this aspect as well. For instance, in jobs like emergency services, speed plays a very important role.  

Art history Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words - 5

Art history - Essay Example Condottiere was the name given to the captain or leader who commanded a mercenary in the 14th and 15th century in Italy. The leader together with his mercenary engaged in fights in the Italian city-states on behalf of the contracting Papacy and the city-states. Thus, the word condottiere originated from condottiero meaning contractor. The mercenary worked with states directly fighting for them, and a fighting contract was signed with the highest bidder. Nevertheless, the contract bound them to a certain city or state with whom the contract was signed, but they moved from one lord or city to another, a game that was fatal for both parties. Additionally, some condottiere had their own small towns acquired through inheritance of conquer, for example, Attendolos who founded the Sforza family. In the Renaissance society, military skill was very expensive, but a wealthy city such as Venice was in a position to afford the services of a condottiere and his mercenary. Therefore, such wealthy cities hired military services only when needed, and this provided a way for them to spare its citizens from the horror and the rigors of war, and save on the cost of maintaining a standing military. Furthermore, the condottiere played a significant role in influencing the field of art as some of the greatest statues of all time in Italy were of the condottiere. An example of work of art that demonstrates the role of condottiere is Denatello’s Equestrian Statue of Erasmo da Narni, referred to as Gattamelata.

The Concept of Risk in Diffirent Project Management Approaches Essay

The Concept of Risk in Diffirent Project Management Approaches - Essay Example If we talk about the risk management in agile (Scum) software project management, it basically allows us to deal with risks on the daily basis. For instance, till the end of a day we identify and record the project risks. On the other hand, PRINCE2 goes beyond the definition of risk as it divides the risk into two categories on the basis of their positive or negative consequences. These two categories can be threat and opportunity. In this scenario, a threat could be an uncertain activity or action which if it occurs can cause negative effect on the project’s likelihood of achieving its objectives. On the other hand, an opportunity is an event if it takes place can cause a favorable and advantageous effect on the project likelihood of achieving its objectives (Brady, 2009; Rehman et al., 2010; TutorialsPoint, 2012). However, in this paper we will consider the risk as a threat. In addition, risk management is an essential element of both the Agile (scrum) and Prince2 project ma nagement approaches. This paper will discuss the concept of risk from the perspective of Prince2 and Scrum project management approaches. ... According to this attribute, risk may or may not take place; in other words, we are not 100% sure about the occurrence of possible risks. On the other hand, another attribute is acknowledged as â€Å"loss†. According to this attribute, the risk turns into a certainty, unnecessary outcome or losses can take place. Hence, while evaluating project risks, it is necessary to assess the degree of loss and the level of improbability associated with each risk (Pressman, 2001, p.146; Kerzner, 2006, p.743). In addition, risk management is the process of identifying, measuring, and managing what might go in the wrong way into a project before it turns out to be a danger to the successful completion of the project or the implementation of a software application. Moreover, risk management is a very important skill to manage a project successfully (Turban et al., 2005, p.712; Whitten et al., 2000, p.83). According to (Murthi, 2002), large software systems cannot be developed without facing a wide variety of risks. In this scenario, a report published by â€Å"The Standish Group† with the name of "CHAOS: A Recipe for Success," shows that only less than 30% of all software development projects are within budget and on time as well as fulfil all their indented requirements. On the other hand, more than 70% either fail or do not fulfil software development goals. Additionally, these facts are frightening in a cost-cutting measure where software systems play a significant role in fact they can make or break the organization (Murthi, 2002). In this paper, we will use the approach of identifying, measuring, and managing what might go in the wrong way into a project before it becomes problem for the successful completion of a project. Concept of Risk in Prince2 Project Management

Ultimate Toronto Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Ultimate Toronto - Assignment Example The current option is one that is based on fees that are used to create the right alternatives for those that are a part of the club (Ivey, 2012). This is combined with expectations for pricing changes that can be used. The finances can become an opportunity by changing the budgetary needs and prices to incorporate into the organization for growth and to change the other areas of the company’s needs. The research and development is an opportunity of the company. Currently, there is not a lot of research and development within TUC. However, the social nature and the affiliations with others are leading to more opportunities and changes that are expected with TUC. Promotion opportunities, known pricing and the development in the area have all been looked into and can create new strategies and development in TUC if they are expanded on (Simanis, Hart, 2008). The purchasing in TUC is a weakness. The company has identified ways to promote and change prices. However, the purchasing is still going into the foundational expectations for promotion and development, such as flyers, prints and advertisements. The known strategy for promotions is not combining with the purchasing that is developed for the sustainability and growth of TUC. This is combined with the non – profit status, which limits how much can be purchased or used (Ivey, 2012). The operations offers opportunities if a strategy is developed. Currently, one individual is looking at the strategies and opportunities while combining a promotional team. All other situations are run by volunteers and those that are a part of the teams. The operations need to be reconsidered in terms of being a non – profit. It also needs to be reconsidered strategically with human assets that can contribute to the growth of TUC. The operations then become a weakness that can turn into an opportunity of altered (Loorbach, Bakel,

Victor Frankenstein Essay Example for Free

Victor Frankenstein Essay He uses imagery to give examples for how he felt, like when he says I crept from my kennel as though he was a disgraced dog, and treated like an animal. At this point, the reader may have changed their views about the creation, but Frankenstein certainly hasnt. He knows about how well spoken the monster is and thinks of it as a trick, to lure people into keeping him company. He says to Robert Walton that the creature is eloquent and persuasive, and once his words had a power over my heart; but trust him not. Frankenstein still believes the creature is to blame. When Walton sees the creature for the first time, he believes what Frankenstein told him on his deathbed. He says I beheld a vision so horrible as his face, of such loathsome yet appalling hideousness. It shows the reader how the monsters appearance somehow overshadows the beauty of its speech. Finally, Shelley uses some archaic language to show the historical context of the book. She uses the word deamon when Frankenstein refers to the monster and this spelling of the word is no longer used. Shelley chose this word to describe the creature because it has connotations of the devil and evil ways. This links in with Shelleys society and religion because everyone was religious and using the word deamon would show just how much hate Frankenstein had for his monster. Frankenstein, by using this particular word for the creature, shows how he feels that he is the innocent one. When the monster speaks, his language is very fluent, smooth and flowing which links in well with the Romantic Movement, which was very much around at the time, the book was written. The structure of the book is very interesting as it starts at the end, then goes back in time to explain the story. This gives the reader a chance to hear Frankensteins side of the story as he tells it to Robert Walton. The first part of the book is written as epistolary. This means it is written as a form of letters put together into a story. First, there are letters from Robert Walton to his sister Margaret. These letters make it clear that he has an obsession, much like Frankensteins, about reaching the North Pole. He then mentions that he has met a stranger, and goes on to inform Margaret of Frankensteins story. We hear Frankensteins story, right up to where he reaches Waltons ship, and then it continues in the form of epistolary. The structure is very interesting, because Walton writes about his own story to Margaret and his story includes Frankensteins story which also includes the creatures story. So Walton who is writing to his sister (and the audience) communicates all three stories in his letters. The narrative structure is very clever, because I think the same end would have happened to Walton if Frankenstein hadnt have come along and informed him of the dangers of obsessions, it would have ruined his life, as the creation of the monster ruined Frankensteins. It was obviously morally wrong of Frankenstein to devote his life to his obsession, where his life was perfect before this fixation with natural philosophy. He shunned his friends, and if he had not done this to create the monster, they would not have all been killed. There are many points where the reader does not know whether he was morally wrong or not, and the best example of this is when he decides to make the creature. It would have been morally wrong to unnaturally create life in the 19th century, but there is more leeway today as there are so many different views on genetic engineering. Taken as a whole, I think that Victor Frankenstein was morally reprehensible. Even in the 21st century, where the creation of life is more frequent, I think it was morally wrong to take body parts from dead people. I think he should have realised the terrible consequences of his actions before he went ahead with the creation. He did so much research into natural philosophy and he should have realised from his study that he needed to learn from other peoples experiences. His obsession with being the first got in the way of him thinking straight. I think Frankenstein leaving the monster to fend for himself was also morally wrong. All human beings are cared for once they are born, so leaving the monster alone is suggesting that he isnt human and doesnt deserve to be treated as one. As the creature was often out in the open, this gave him a chance to be shunned and discriminated against by society which introduced the feelings of hatred and aggression which were used later on to destroy Frankensteins happiness. Frankenstein is really responsible, because if he were not so obsessed with natural philosophy and the death of his mother, he would never have developed a passion for saving life and would never have discovered that creating life was possible. He only had himself to blame for the destruction caused by the creature; not only to himself but to those he loved. Frankenstein never really admitted the responsibility, he said that God gave him the power, I found such astonishing power placed upon my hands, I hesitated a long time concerning the manner in which I should employ it and though he did take a long time to think about what to do, he reached never realised the full outcome of his decision. Although he realised his mistake at the end, and tried to put someone off making the same one, he never admitted the responsibility out loud. So, in conclusion to the title, Id say that Victor Frankenstein is a very morally reprehensible character. Show preview only The above preview is unformatted text This student written piece of work is one of many that can be found in our GCSE Mary Shelley section.

Taliban vs Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Essay Example for Free

Taliban vs Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Essay Afghanistan is a mountainous land-locked country, which is one of the central Asian countries. In addition, it is an Islamic country that Islam religion has played a significant role in governing it. In Afghanistan Many governments had been changed in past several decades. For instance, the Kingdom of Amanullah Khan, the Kingdom of Mohammad Nadir Shah, Mohammad Zahir Shah, The Communist Regimes, the Islamic State of Afghanistan, Taliban Regime, Interim Government, Transitional Government, and the Islamic Republic Governments. As most of us agree that the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan changed very much in contrast to passed governments, especially Taliban Regime. This piece of writing concentrates on similarities and differences of Taliban Regime and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The similarities are fewer among the mentioned governments; however, the differences between them are several. First the similarities will be discussed; secondly the differences will be pointed. The first similarity between these two governments is that in Taliban Regime laws and regulations of Islam was implemented and maintained in according with Sharia’s laws. It always tried to carry on the Islamic laws on people and disputes. There were three types of courts such as, Primary Court, Appealing Court, and Supreme Court. In a similar way, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is also trying to implement Islamic rules and regulations. It is also seeking to help people by solving the disputes by carrying on the rules of Islam. For solving the cases and disputes, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is structured three types of courts, for instance, Primary Court, Appealing Court, and Supreme Court. Another likeness between Taliban Regime and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is the centrality of government in Kabul. From the first invasion that Taliban did, they had the plan take the control over Kabul, after capturing the Kabul City, Taliban decided to establish their central government in Kabul City. For all of their time in government, their central government was located in Kabul. Similarly, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, from the beginning of its government, the central government organizations are located in Kabul City. The third similarity between those two mentioned governments is the patronage of some foreign countries of both governments, Taliban Regime and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. When Taliban came to the power, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and reportedly United States of America were the strongest supporters of Taliban Regime. The first country that supported them was Pakistan. Pakistan always announced their support of Taliban Regime. Furthermore, it also provided the Taliban Regime an enormous amount of money and military equipments. Likewise, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is also supported by some countries, such as, USA, some European Countries, Japan, India, Turkey, and many others. They all give any kinds of support for the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The most obvious difference among these two governments is in education. For example, in Taliban Regime, there were no education facilities for females. Females were not allowed to attend schools and universities. They were all far from education. Taliban’s thought was that if a girls or a woman go to school, they would learn not Islamic principles. In contrast, in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, females are allowed to join schools, universities and other education centers to have education. Moreover, the government is also trying to provide opportunities for both males and females to get educated and even to complete their educations outside Afghanistan. The next very important difference between these two governments is entertainment. In Taliban Regime there was not any kind of entertainment for pleasure and enjoyments. There was just one TV and one radio station by the name Islamic State TV and Radio Station that showed and played just all the fundamental issues of Islam. There were no music, movies, cinemas, and parties. Even in wedding and other parties if someone played music, he or she would be punished and sent prison. On the other hand, In the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, there are more than twenty TV channels and almost eighty radio stations that bring enjoyments and pleasure in people’s lives. People can have music in their weddings and parties. They can play music, watch TVs, and listen to radios. Another distinction between these two mentioned governments was the governing system of each. For example, in Taliban Regime, the government was just over several provinces. They did not have control all over Afghanistan although they had a central government in Kabul. Their government was always in risk that one day it would be collapse. Some of the important offices were not run properly. There was not good management in ministries. Corruption was in most ministries, especially in courts. Instead, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan contains a good and proper governing system. It is trying to offer chances of development for its employees and offices. It has got line by line authority of command. It is a selective government. There is National Assembly of Afghanistan. Furthermore, members for National Assembly of Afghanistan are selected by people. There are appropriate procedures of doing something in government offices. The other difference between Taliban Regime and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is that in Taliban Regime women were not allowed to get out of their houses lonely. And they were not allowed to walk lonely in the markets and streets. If a woman found alone in anywhere in the city, one of her family member would be punished. Conversely, there is no one that people would afraid of them in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan women are free to go anywhere like restaurants and markets. The economical perspective is another difference among Taliban Regime and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In most of the provinces of Afghanistan during the Taliban period were wars happening. Therefore, people lift their homes and went to other countries. There were no farmers, no engineers, no doctors, overall no professionals that could help Afghanistan’s economy to develop. The government income was very less but the prices for goods were so high. No one invested in Afghanistan because being insure about the future of government. In contrast, in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, countries are hardly trying to invest in Afghanistan’s infrastructures. The government by itself is seeking to provide job opportunities for Afghan people. Professionals who lifted Afghanistan in Taliban Regime are coming back to their country to bring new ideas of development. In conclusion, it is now clear to most of us that Afghanistan had a very old history. Furthermore, the above facts show and indicate that Afghanistan passed a very difficult situation. The hardest situation that Afghanistan crossed through is the Taliban Regime. Although, some people are in support of Taliban Regime in past, but now some people are against them because of some difficulties in compare to this government, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Although there are some similarities between these two governments, but there are several differences between them.

Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations

Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations I. Introduction In 1957, Henry Kissinger aptly wrote that ‘ever since the end of the Second World War brought us not the peace we sought so earnestly, but an uneasy armistice, we have responded by what can best be described as a flight into technology: by devising ever more fearful weapons. The more powerful the weapons, however, the greater become the reluctance to use them. [1] He referred to the nuclear weapons as a powerful device that deters superpowers from major conflicts. His vision proved to be true, albeit difficult process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament throughout the Cold War period and beyond. Henceforth, common reluctance to use these deadly arsenals does not necessarily stop powerful states from acquiring them up to a certain deterrent level. Instead, nuclear weapons are even proliferated and technically perfected, and this, in my view, is the most striking dilemma and serves as the paradox of nuclear weapons. The year 2010 will be a very critical year for multilateral negotiation and talks on nuclear arms control and nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), [2] since the future of NPT and the progress and implementation of each of its article will be assessed through its five-yearly Review mechanism.[3] In particular, what it makes more crucial and fascinating is the promise made by US President Barack Obama on potential reduction of nuclear weapons. In his policy statement delivered in Prague, April 5th, 2009, President Barack Obama has made it very clear that he envisioned ‘a world that is free from nuclear weapons.'[4] Five months later, pouring all influence, persuasion and personal charms, President Obama chaired a meeting of the UN Security Council, which unanimously supported his vision. President Obamas initiative and political will his administration is willing to invest to build a critical mass and new thrust needed to move the troubled NPT in the next Review Conference in 2010. Yet, one must be well aware that reviving the NPT requires more than just rhetoric. One of the main articles of NPT, Article VI, clearly stipulates that the nuclear weapons states parties to the Treaty are under obligation to negotiate in good faith a nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control at the earliest possible date.[5] Unfortunately, the sole multilateral negotiating forum entrusted to negotiate nuclear disarmament treaty, the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, has failed to start the negotiations ever since it managed to conclude painstakingly the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). At this point, one important question to ask is whether or not the international community should see President Obamas recent drive to revive the negotiation of the reduction of US Russia nuclear arsenals as an integral part of this long-term vision—a world that is free of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, what strategy are now being devised to ensure the success of negotiation on both bilateral and more importantly multilateral fronts, provided that attempts to any reduction—particularly as dramatic and steep as it was contained in recent Obamas initiative—will encounter serious hurdles and challenges. It therefore surely remains to be seen whether this bilateral negotiation is driven by President Obamas long-term vision to totally get rid of these weapons of mass-destruction or by other ulterior motives. As mandated by Article VI of the NPT, negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be conducted multilaterally. Besides, if nuclear weapons were fought the whole world would suffer. It is therefore unfair to sideline the non-nuclear-weapons possessing states in the negotiation. The study therefore discusses the dynamics of nuclear disarmament proliferation treaty, by analyzing the policy of the U.S.—as one of the major nuclear weapon states (NWS)—on nuclear proliferation, and its interaction towards other nuclear states. It tries to answer one key question: ‘Why are the nuclear-weapons-possessing states, as parties to the NPT, so reluctant to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control? As the study carries the task to provide a clear understanding on the hesitation of nuclear weapon states in negotiating a comprehensive disarmament, it is therefore considered important for us to look at the theoretical as well as policy contexts. Hence, discussion presented in the study is threefold, namely: (1) the conceptual framework and theoretical foundations; (2) policy development surrounding nuclear disarmament; and; (3) the recent dynamics of NPT in conjunction with the attitude of the U.S. as one of the major nuclear weapons states. II. Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Foundations: Imagining Security, Survival and National Interests This study argues that the nuclear weapons states are so reluctant to negotiate the treaty for they firmly believed that their security and indeed existence (survival) critically hinges upon these weapons of mass-destruction, retaining and perfecting them thereby are mandatory. That above argument also underpins the departing point of our journey to understand the extent to which sense of insecurity and need for survival reinforce nuclear weapons states reluctance to conduct nuclear disarmament negotiations. The concepts of security and survival are essentially parts of the national interests of any state, including the nuclear weapon states. The two key concepts along with its national interest maximization are also core concepts of realism in the study of international relations. Under the logic and circumstances of anarchy, states are assumed to always rely on its own capability for survival. It is therefore a self-help system of international relations within which states and nations are living. Furthermore, a state, especially the smaller or less-powerful one, does have limited options or strategies for its survival. In a rather simplistic illustration, states can either compete or cooperate in advancing its respective national interests. Henceforth, to the realists, state of anarchy makes it more difficult for any state to cooperate with one another. In pursuing this, states often find themselves at odd to build alliance(s) with other states, yet, without any solid assurances concerning full commitments of each member of these cooperative and/or non-cooperative situations. There are a number of theories to explain that, widely stemming from the sense of insecurity to creating absolute gains (neo-liberal tradition) to building a complex of security identity (as proposed by a more recent constructivist tradition of international relations). Robert Jervis (1978) posed a valid question of why states would cooperate, provided that anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation seemingly impossible. In other words, presumably, there must be some mechanisms which would allow states to bind themselves (and other members of the alliance) not to defect, or a mechanism by which to detect defection at the earliest possible stage, which enable an appropriate early response.[6] In so doing, states often find themselves under a dilemma—security dilemma. Despite of the many definitions and understanding on what constitute security dilemma, the essence of the dilemma is that â€Å"security seeking states more often than not get too much and too little, by assuming military posture that resembles that of an aggressor, which in turn causes states to assume the worst, and these attempts to increase security are consequently self-defeating.†[7] The more a state increases its security, the more it is likely for other state(s) to become insecure. In order to understand the situation under which security policies and strategies are formulated and thus executed, Jervis examines the conflicting situations by providing two basic models for situations of tension and conflict, based on the intentions of the adversary: spiral and deterrence. In the spiral model, intentions of both actors are objectively benign, whereas in the deterrence model, intentions of the adversary are malign.[8] Furthermore, in his deterrence model, Jervis (1976) ‘introduces a concept of malign power-seeking adversary, whereby actors in this situation are pursuing incompatible goals thus, making the strategy of deterrence the best possible option. In contrast, in the spiral model—often referred to as the true or ‘purest security dilemma situation, both actors are security-seekers, thus their interests are compatible.'[9] Yet, as analyzed by Andrej Nosko (2005), ‘the problem remains the inability of actors to distinguish which game they are playing, and what are the intentions of their adversaries.'[10] Although, according to Jervis it may not be possible to overcome the dilemma completely, it still may be possible to ‘break out of the security dilemma.'[11] He therefore suggests two major solutions to overcome the situation: Firstly, ‘to check the cognitive processes, when the adversarys intention is being perceived, so that the adversary is understood correctly. His second suggestion is ‘to employ specific military posture consisting of procurement of weapons that are useful for deterrence without simultaneously being as effective for aggression.'[12] Those practical suggestions form a powerful tool of analysis in what is referred to as ‘offense-defense balance variables, which are significant extension to the security dilemma further expanded by Jervis (and also by Glaser and Kaufmann, among others), as shown in the matrix below.[13] Source: , Strategy, Security Dilemma, and the Offense-Defense Balance, lecture material, accessed from http://ocw.tufts.edu/data/58/726832.pdf. In regard with the logic of nuclear weapons capability, it surely remain unclear whether or not the nuclear warheads installed in various Inter-Continental or Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs/SLBMs) constitute offensive or defensive, since the defense against ICBMs is ICBMs (deterrence) and SLBMs, on the other hand, are less accurate hence defensive. Therefore, security dilemma can be removed accordingly through the significant reduction of the number of nuclear warheads. As actors are striving to attain security while they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others, thus the intentions and motives of the actors are important primarily for any realists. In the U.S. case, while intentions for major reduction in its nuclear capability seemed to be imminent, yet, one looming question is whether other ‘adversarial nuclear weapons states such as North Korea would immediately follow the suit to reduce or eliminate its nuclear capabilities. Critics and pessimists were quick to answer that such a possibility for others to bandwagon and support the U.S. initiatives are too far-fetched, for a number of reasons such as the national aspiration to obtain nuclear capabilities, sense of insecurity, and the need to â€Å"hedge† its national security from possible nuclear outbreak in the future as part and parcel of their national threat perception. At this point, it is important to add other major concepts in the study of security from the lenses of (neo-)realism, as presented by Waltz (in his systemic self-help and survival theories) or Buzan in his concepts of threats and vulnerability. The links of these various concepts are quite clear: within a convoluted and uncertain international environment, it is postulated that ‘the mere uncertainty of international life creates a threatening environment for a state.'[14] While threats are normally coming from outside the country, vulnerabilities are, on the other, internal in nature, which demonstrate a ‘deficiency in the capability of a state to manage its security affairs.'[15] As argued further by Buzan, vulnerability can be reduced primarily by increasing self-reliance, or by countervailing forces to deal with specific threats.[16] Hypothetically speaking, obtaining or maintaining the level of nuclear warheads to hedge its security interests vis-a-vis other states is a ‘double-edged sword that can be used to minimize both threats and reduce vulnerability at the same time. The theoretical approach of this study suggests that there is a strong interlink between domestic/national considerations (i.e. political alignments in domestic politics and other domestic factors) on what constitute national vulnerability (which may derived from different sources of insecurity, widely stemming from economic, political, as well as the level of military capability relative to others, and vice versa) and threatening international system and environment (including not only the emerging and continued threats from its adversaries, but also the uncertainty of international regimes). This, for instance, has been quite evident in the case of Post-9/11 U.S. security policy in which strong bipartisanship on the Hill on what constitute major threat to security and how it should be overcome was built. Arguably, political dynamics will always affect a decision made by the Executive, and even more so in the national security domain. And a policy maker would eventually take all the se into his or her consideration. Presumably, President Obamas decision on the steep reduction—even elimination of nuclear warheads—was the result of these various considerations e.g. shared concerns amongst the elites over the possible illegal and illicit spread of nuclear warheads. III. Relative Peace amidst Constant Threats of Nuclear Annihilation: Deterrence, Negotiations, and Idiosyncrasy Indeed, in reality, questions and discourses surrounding nuclear weapons and its delivery systems remain as elusive and fascinating as ever, both in its theoretical and practical terms. One of the difficult puzzles that the epistemic community of international relations and strategic studies has been trying to understand and explain is the fact that despite its imminent threats of destruction within the context of intense Cold War, no single nuclear weapon has been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. While this is surely a surprising, yet, welcomed situation, especially amongst non-nuclear weapons states, yet, it does not mean that the world is totally free from the fear and threats of global destruction caused by nuclear war. Arguably, this relative peaceful situation can be understood at least through three different prisms: first, the role of deterrence; second, diplomatic measures and negotiations; and, third, idiosyncrasy. Deterrence. In essence, a number of scholars and practitioners are convinced that nuclear capability has been playing an important role in deterring (external) threats.[17] Furthermore, nuclear deterrence provides strategic blanket in three specific terms: first, protection against attacks with nuclear weapons; second, protection against attacks with conventional forces; and, third, indefinable additional diplomatic clout.[18] Theoretically, some analysts of international relations and strategic studies believe that the relative peace is attainable mostly through effective deterrence, coercion, and all its derivative concepts such as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and Balance of Terror.[19] In his robust argument, Robert Jervis (1989) reiterated ‘the significance of the theory of the nuclear revolution: in a world of mutual second-strike nuclear capability (where an adversarys first strike cannot prevent a states retaliation), military victory in a total war is impossible.'[20] The handling of strategic nuclear weapons policy is also not without any idealistic consideration. In the hands of policy handlers, apart from the need to deter, another major consideration surrounding strategic nuclear policy is the moral and ethical dilemma that entail. For the US as a major nuclear weapons state, for instance, the dilemma is aptly captured by Robert E. Osgood (1988), who clearly stated the following: In the period since World War II, the United States has encountered moral and strategic issues concerning the management of force in peacetime that are unique in its historical experience and novel in the history of international politics. At the core of these issues lies a dilemma—namely, the moral (as well as ethical) and strategic predicament of being unable to pursue one course of action without incurring the disadvantage of another. It arises from the dependence of military security on nuclear weapons. This nuclear dilemma lurks in the background of every major military strategic choice and suffuses all major strategic debates. The history of US strategic thought can be largely be comprehended as the story of how Americans have tried to cope with this dilemma by rejecting, abolishing, or mitigating it.[21] Furthermore, he continued by defining precisely the dilemma the US (as arguably other nuclear weapons states) is facing in regard with its nuclear arsenal depository, as follows: The nuclear dilemma is simply an expression of the momentous fact that the security and peace of the United States and its major allies depend heavily on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, and on the fact that this deterrent, if used, would very probably lead to self-defeating destruction and, possibly, an ecological catastrophe for much of civilization.[22] In his critical analysis, Wilson (2008) however seriously questioned the role of deterrence in preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. His arguments rest on the assumption that the policy makers have so far misunderstood the true concept of deterrence. He maintained that that the logics of nuclear deterrence, as widely perceived by the policy-makers, were unwarranted simply because they either built on a fallacy of assumptions or were based on disproven facts.[23] Countering Kissingers arguments that nuclear attacks would likely to happen on major populous cities, as happened on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Wilson asserted that there has been no single solid evidence on the intention of the former USSR to attack U.S. major cities even at the height of nuclear tension during the Cold War. As he argued further, An examination of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows doubtful successes and proven failures. If the conventional wisdom is wrong—if nuclear weapons might not deter nuclear attacks, do not deter conventional attacks, and do not reliably provide diplomatic leverage—then the case for disarmament, nonproliferation and banning nuclear weapons is immeasurably strengthened.[24] In the post 9/11 tragedy, the nature and logic of asymmetric wars has added more complexity to the already difficult policy options.[25] Fear from the possibility of illicit transfer and/or nuclear acquisitions by the so-called ‘terrorist groups, it is very clear that the US and its allies have been undertaking all possible diplomatic initiatives and even military actions to deny these groups access to any nuclear materials.[26] Negotiations and Diplomatic Measure. It is also worth to mention the role of diplomacy and diplomatic efforts in ensuring countries do not resort to their nuclear arsenal to settle whatever disputes they may have with one another. In this regard, the role of negotiators in ensuring the commitments and compliance of all states—both nuclear and non-nuclear ones—to international code of conducts and norms of non-proliferation is also significant. To date, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains at the very helm of global endeavor to keep the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and at the same time, restraining states from diverting its peaceful nuclear program towards provocative and militaristic uses. Corollary to this is the most authoritative nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime—the NPT- which was concluded in 1968 and has entered into force since 5 March 1974. Consisting of a Preamble and 11 articles,[27] more often than not that the treaty is widely interpreted as â€Å"a three pillar system†, namely: non-proliferation; disarmament ; and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. [28] In operation, a safeguards system to verify compliance with the NPT is established under the auspices of the IAEA one of which is conducted through site inspections. As outlined in the Treaty, NPT seeks to promote cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including the use of nuclear energy and equal access to this technology for all States parties, and provide safeguards that prevent the diversion of fissile material for the development of nuclear weapons.[29] Idiosyncrasy. In contrast with the above analysis on the role of deterrence and diplomatic measures, a more recent study by Nina Tannenwald (2007) revealed a striking fact concerning the idiosyncratic factor of U.S. leaders regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald was able to dispute the widely accepted theory of deterrence as primary inhibitor to an open and global-scale nuclear war. Instead, she was in favor of what she calls a nuclear taboo, a widespread inhibition on using nuclear arsenals—which has arguably arisen in global politics. By analyzing four critical instances of wars where U.S. leaders considered using nuclear weapons (namely Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991), Tannenwald produced a rich and convincing explanation on how the nuclear taboo has successfully helped prevent the U.S. and other world leaders from resorting to these ultimate weapons of mass-destruction. [30] In other words, Tannenwald believed that there has been some moral ingredient within the policy makers in regard with the use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, from the leadership perspective and beliefs, Jacques E.C. Hymans (2006) convincingly demonstrates that leaders do play significant role in achieving nuclear capabilities.[31] Based on his findings on contending interests of leaders in the attainment of nuclear capabilities, he suggests three possible responses: first, a stricter international non-proliferation regime—controlling supply-demand side; second, nuclear abolition, in which the nuclear weapons states make much ‘more serious efforts towards disarmament and ‘resist the temptation to threaten nuclear attacks against non-nuclear weapons states, as they promised to do in Article VI and again at the NPT Review Conference in 2000; and, third, preventive military action/intervention against regimes whose leaders harbor nuclear weapons ambitions.[32] Apparently, those three responses are in combination taking place in todays world politics and international security. Despite their differences in mode of operation, all three prescriptions above do tell us common assumption that: nuclear weapons are highly attractive to many states; that nuclear weapons tend to proliferate. As argued by Hymans, ‘the ultimate solution to the proliferation puzzle lies in some sort of fundamental change to the international system, be it sovereignty-crashing inspections, universal disarmament, or a wholesale revision on the laws of war.'[33]This entails the need to change the way international law operates, which so far is seen as rather ineffective to ensure compliance. As radical it may sound, yet, it is surely rather difficult to be implemented on the ground. IV. Recent Major Development: A Fresher Outlook of Multilateral Negotiation? As one of the key nuclear weapons states, The U.S. has sheer diplomatic and military clout over the future of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the global scale. In this regard, it is important to note that any debate concerning the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is strategically important and critical. This has been truer especially since the new Obama Administration has expressed its commitments to pursue a deep and steep cut in its nuclear force, and to launch a major review of U.S. nuclear policy, which will hopefully be submitted to the Congress in February 2010. With its 2,200 operational strategic warheads (while the overall U.S. force to date is merely a fraction of one-fourth of its size a decade ago), yet, it is more capable to destroy an adversarys nuclear weapons before they can be used. In the realm of nuclear disarmament negotiations, the weight the U.S. diplomacy can throw to the success or failure of the negotiations is also visible. This was clearly shown, for instance, in President Obamas success to round commitments from the P-5 countries during last UNSC Summit on NPT on 24 September 2009, which unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009). Resolution 1887 itself spells out, inter-alia, the â€Å"calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations and fulfil their commitments under the Treaty† as well as refrain themselves from nuclear test explosion and sign the CTBT, and also exercise stricter measures to sensitive materials†[34]—as means to avoid nuclear warheads from falling into the terrorist group. The expected band-wagonning effect of the U.S. commitments, especially on the part of non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to NPT, will be prominent, thus, making the study of the Obama Administrations nuclear policy becomes more critical in our attempts to understand the dynamics of nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations. But, what is the real impact of President Obamas initiatives on the future nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations? To begin with, the U.S.—like any other country, has its own strategic sense of security—and even vulnerability, as reflected in the contours of its proliferation policies of the past decade or so. Sense of Insecurity. The threat of terrorism is one that is getting more prominence since 9/11. But deep beneath its psyche, the U.S. Government(s) continue to assert the US nuclear strategy does not hinge any longer on being able to deter a single, comparably powerful, nuclear rival. It goes even further beyond that. For instance, the Bush administrations 2002 National Security Strategy embraced ‘pre-emptive attacks, against certain potential adversaries, rather than a strategy of deterrence, under the assumption that terrorist groups and even certain ‘rogue states cannot be deterred.'[35] Furthermore, the same Administration stated in its 2006 National Security Strategy that despite its recognition to address the issues of proliferation through diplomacy and in concert with its allies and partners, the ‘the place of pre-emption in our national security strategy remains the same.'[36] Departing from his predecessors position, in his illuminating speech in Prague, President Obama introduced a (new) calculus of US nuclear strategy. He outlined the intention of the U.S. to, among others, ‘aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), ‘seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons as means to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, and ‘strengthen the NPT as basis for cooperation.'[37] He further shared some initiatives for international cooperation. These include the efforts to strengthen the treaty and to need put resources and authority to strengthen international inspections, as well as the need to build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation including an international fuel bank. He also called for â€Å"real and immediate consequences† for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without cause—referring to the North Korea and Iran specifically.[38] President Obamas promise to fulfill his ‘world-that-is-free-from-nuclear-weapons vision indeed sparked optimism. Analyst like Tom Sauer (2009) even predicts that â€Å"the nuclear weapon states may opt sooner for nuclear elimination than generally expected, due to five factors: first, the danger of nuclear proliferation; second, the risk of nuclear terrorism; third, the nuclear taboo—as outlined earlier; fourth, the technological advancement of missile defense against nuclear arsenals, which reduced the ‘shock and awe capability of nuclear weapons; fifth, the increased importance of international laws.[39] While the optimism seems to be warranted, yet, it might be too little too soon for us to conclude that the age of nuclear proliferation is practically over. President Obamas promise will face a number of hurdles, from within and outside the U.S. Nuclear Rivalries. It will be immediately tested this year when the US and Russia resume haggling on an arms reduction pact and again meet at the crucial UN nuclear arms conference in May. Whether or not the American and Russian negotiators could agree on a successor pact to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1) to cut nuclear weapons would serve as the litmus test on the feasibility of President Obamas calls. START-1 was an initiative proposed by the late U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1982, and completed under the administrations of U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. As stipulated by the treaty, each country could deploy no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles — the single largest bilateral reductions in history.†[40] The concerns—and indeed stakes are now getting much heightened particularly since both Washington and Moscow missed their deadline in December to agree to ‘a new arms control treaty, which would have cut the worlds two largest nuclear arsenals by up to a third, though they vowed to generally abide by the old one while continuing negotiations. The good news is that the overall outline of the new treaty is apparent. At a meeting in Moscow in July 2009, Presidents Obama and Dmitry Medvedev narrowed the range for a cap on warheads to between 1,500 and 1,675, down from about 2,200, which each side now has. They are also expected to lower the ceiling on delivery vehicles intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-based missiles and strategic bombers to below 800, from 1,600. [41] It is widely believed that ‘a successor to START-1 would help restore relations between Moscow and Washington, which recently sank to a post-Cold War low due to many political and diplomatic upheavals as shown in the rift between the two countries over problems in Chechnya, Russian attacks on Georgia in August 2008, and so forth. In that sense, the new treaty should become ‘another milestone in disarmament and non-proliferation, taking the interaction between the US and Russia to a higher level and reaffirming their common goal of promoting mutual as well as global security.'[42] While the US and Russia are now still grappling over a few key differences (e.g. verification procedures) in their respective position concerning the common policy of nuclear weapons/warheads reduction, there are no guarantees that talks would yield a provisional accord. More fundamentally, the problems between these two largest and most important nuclear weapon states are more deeply rooted. Some within the U.S. strategic elites, particularly from the â€Å"republican camp,† argued that U.S. policymakers need to critically examine Russias views on nuclear weapons and doctrine. While successive U.S. Administrations have announced that Russia is no longer the enemy, Russia still considers the United States its â€Å"principal adversary,† despite President Barack Obamas attempts to â€Å"reset† bilateral relations. U.S. national leadership and arms control negotiators need to understand Russias nuclear doctrine and negotiating style as they are, not as the U.S. wants them to be.[43] In addition, Russia is not the only nuclear rival that the U.S. is facing. In the longer term, China, as dubbed by many analysts and observers, is likely to pose serious â€Å"challenges† to the status of the U.S. as the worlds dominant hyper-power. The rise of China as prominent nuclear power would eventually Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations Dynamics of Nuclear Disarmament Multilateral Negotiations I. Introduction In 1957, Henry Kissinger aptly wrote that ‘ever since the end of the Second World War brought us not the peace we sought so earnestly, but an uneasy armistice, we have responded by what can best be described as a flight into technology: by devising ever more fearful weapons. The more powerful the weapons, however, the greater become the reluctance to use them. [1] He referred to the nuclear weapons as a powerful device that deters superpowers from major conflicts. His vision proved to be true, albeit difficult process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament throughout the Cold War period and beyond. Henceforth, common reluctance to use these deadly arsenals does not necessarily stop powerful states from acquiring them up to a certain deterrent level. Instead, nuclear weapons are even proliferated and technically perfected, and this, in my view, is the most striking dilemma and serves as the paradox of nuclear weapons. The year 2010 will be a very critical year for multilateral negotiation and talks on nuclear arms control and nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), [2] since the future of NPT and the progress and implementation of each of its article will be assessed through its five-yearly Review mechanism.[3] In particular, what it makes more crucial and fascinating is the promise made by US President Barack Obama on potential reduction of nuclear weapons. In his policy statement delivered in Prague, April 5th, 2009, President Barack Obama has made it very clear that he envisioned ‘a world that is free from nuclear weapons.'[4] Five months later, pouring all influence, persuasion and personal charms, President Obama chaired a meeting of the UN Security Council, which unanimously supported his vision. President Obamas initiative and political will his administration is willing to invest to build a critical mass and new thrust needed to move the troubled NPT in the next Review Conference in 2010. Yet, one must be well aware that reviving the NPT requires more than just rhetoric. One of the main articles of NPT, Article VI, clearly stipulates that the nuclear weapons states parties to the Treaty are under obligation to negotiate in good faith a nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control at the earliest possible date.[5] Unfortunately, the sole multilateral negotiating forum entrusted to negotiate nuclear disarmament treaty, the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, has failed to start the negotiations ever since it managed to conclude painstakingly the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). At this point, one important question to ask is whether or not the international community should see President Obamas recent drive to revive the negotiation of the reduction of US Russia nuclear arsenals as an integral part of this long-term vision—a world that is free of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, what strategy are now being devised to ensure the success of negotiation on both bilateral and more importantly multilateral fronts, provided that attempts to any reduction—particularly as dramatic and steep as it was contained in recent Obamas initiative—will encounter serious hurdles and challenges. It therefore surely remains to be seen whether this bilateral negotiation is driven by President Obamas long-term vision to totally get rid of these weapons of mass-destruction or by other ulterior motives. As mandated by Article VI of the NPT, negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be conducted multilaterally. Besides, if nuclear weapons were fought the whole world would suffer. It is therefore unfair to sideline the non-nuclear-weapons possessing states in the negotiation. The study therefore discusses the dynamics of nuclear disarmament proliferation treaty, by analyzing the policy of the U.S.—as one of the major nuclear weapon states (NWS)—on nuclear proliferation, and its interaction towards other nuclear states. It tries to answer one key question: ‘Why are the nuclear-weapons-possessing states, as parties to the NPT, so reluctant to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear weapons disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control? As the study carries the task to provide a clear understanding on the hesitation of nuclear weapon states in negotiating a comprehensive disarmament, it is therefore considered important for us to look at the theoretical as well as policy contexts. Hence, discussion presented in the study is threefold, namely: (1) the conceptual framework and theoretical foundations; (2) policy development surrounding nuclear disarmament; and; (3) the recent dynamics of NPT in conjunction with the attitude of the U.S. as one of the major nuclear weapons states. II. Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Foundations: Imagining Security, Survival and National Interests This study argues that the nuclear weapons states are so reluctant to negotiate the treaty for they firmly believed that their security and indeed existence (survival) critically hinges upon these weapons of mass-destruction, retaining and perfecting them thereby are mandatory. That above argument also underpins the departing point of our journey to understand the extent to which sense of insecurity and need for survival reinforce nuclear weapons states reluctance to conduct nuclear disarmament negotiations. The concepts of security and survival are essentially parts of the national interests of any state, including the nuclear weapon states. The two key concepts along with its national interest maximization are also core concepts of realism in the study of international relations. Under the logic and circumstances of anarchy, states are assumed to always rely on its own capability for survival. It is therefore a self-help system of international relations within which states and nations are living. Furthermore, a state, especially the smaller or less-powerful one, does have limited options or strategies for its survival. In a rather simplistic illustration, states can either compete or cooperate in advancing its respective national interests. Henceforth, to the realists, state of anarchy makes it more difficult for any state to cooperate with one another. In pursuing this, states often find themselves at odd to build alliance(s) with other states, yet, without any solid assurances concerning full commitments of each member of these cooperative and/or non-cooperative situations. There are a number of theories to explain that, widely stemming from the sense of insecurity to creating absolute gains (neo-liberal tradition) to building a complex of security identity (as proposed by a more recent constructivist tradition of international relations). Robert Jervis (1978) posed a valid question of why states would cooperate, provided that anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation seemingly impossible. In other words, presumably, there must be some mechanisms which would allow states to bind themselves (and other members of the alliance) not to defect, or a mechanism by which to detect defection at the earliest possible stage, which enable an appropriate early response.[6] In so doing, states often find themselves under a dilemma—security dilemma. Despite of the many definitions and understanding on what constitute security dilemma, the essence of the dilemma is that â€Å"security seeking states more often than not get too much and too little, by assuming military posture that resembles that of an aggressor, which in turn causes states to assume the worst, and these attempts to increase security are consequently self-defeating.†[7] The more a state increases its security, the more it is likely for other state(s) to become insecure. In order to understand the situation under which security policies and strategies are formulated and thus executed, Jervis examines the conflicting situations by providing two basic models for situations of tension and conflict, based on the intentions of the adversary: spiral and deterrence. In the spiral model, intentions of both actors are objectively benign, whereas in the deterrence model, intentions of the adversary are malign.[8] Furthermore, in his deterrence model, Jervis (1976) ‘introduces a concept of malign power-seeking adversary, whereby actors in this situation are pursuing incompatible goals thus, making the strategy of deterrence the best possible option. In contrast, in the spiral model—often referred to as the true or ‘purest security dilemma situation, both actors are security-seekers, thus their interests are compatible.'[9] Yet, as analyzed by Andrej Nosko (2005), ‘the problem remains the inability of actors to distinguish which game they are playing, and what are the intentions of their adversaries.'[10] Although, according to Jervis it may not be possible to overcome the dilemma completely, it still may be possible to ‘break out of the security dilemma.'[11] He therefore suggests two major solutions to overcome the situation: Firstly, ‘to check the cognitive processes, when the adversarys intention is being perceived, so that the adversary is understood correctly. His second suggestion is ‘to employ specific military posture consisting of procurement of weapons that are useful for deterrence without simultaneously being as effective for aggression.'[12] Those practical suggestions form a powerful tool of analysis in what is referred to as ‘offense-defense balance variables, which are significant extension to the security dilemma further expanded by Jervis (and also by Glaser and Kaufmann, among others), as shown in the matrix below.[13] Source: , Strategy, Security Dilemma, and the Offense-Defense Balance, lecture material, accessed from http://ocw.tufts.edu/data/58/726832.pdf. In regard with the logic of nuclear weapons capability, it surely remain unclear whether or not the nuclear warheads installed in various Inter-Continental or Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs/SLBMs) constitute offensive or defensive, since the defense against ICBMs is ICBMs (deterrence) and SLBMs, on the other hand, are less accurate hence defensive. Therefore, security dilemma can be removed accordingly through the significant reduction of the number of nuclear warheads. As actors are striving to attain security while they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others, thus the intentions and motives of the actors are important primarily for any realists. In the U.S. case, while intentions for major reduction in its nuclear capability seemed to be imminent, yet, one looming question is whether other ‘adversarial nuclear weapons states such as North Korea would immediately follow the suit to reduce or eliminate its nuclear capabilities. Critics and pessimists were quick to answer that such a possibility for others to bandwagon and support the U.S. initiatives are too far-fetched, for a number of reasons such as the national aspiration to obtain nuclear capabilities, sense of insecurity, and the need to â€Å"hedge† its national security from possible nuclear outbreak in the future as part and parcel of their national threat perception. At this point, it is important to add other major concepts in the study of security from the lenses of (neo-)realism, as presented by Waltz (in his systemic self-help and survival theories) or Buzan in his concepts of threats and vulnerability. The links of these various concepts are quite clear: within a convoluted and uncertain international environment, it is postulated that ‘the mere uncertainty of international life creates a threatening environment for a state.'[14] While threats are normally coming from outside the country, vulnerabilities are, on the other, internal in nature, which demonstrate a ‘deficiency in the capability of a state to manage its security affairs.'[15] As argued further by Buzan, vulnerability can be reduced primarily by increasing self-reliance, or by countervailing forces to deal with specific threats.[16] Hypothetically speaking, obtaining or maintaining the level of nuclear warheads to hedge its security interests vis-a-vis other states is a ‘double-edged sword that can be used to minimize both threats and reduce vulnerability at the same time. The theoretical approach of this study suggests that there is a strong interlink between domestic/national considerations (i.e. political alignments in domestic politics and other domestic factors) on what constitute national vulnerability (which may derived from different sources of insecurity, widely stemming from economic, political, as well as the level of military capability relative to others, and vice versa) and threatening international system and environment (including not only the emerging and continued threats from its adversaries, but also the uncertainty of international regimes). This, for instance, has been quite evident in the case of Post-9/11 U.S. security policy in which strong bipartisanship on the Hill on what constitute major threat to security and how it should be overcome was built. Arguably, political dynamics will always affect a decision made by the Executive, and even more so in the national security domain. And a policy maker would eventually take all the se into his or her consideration. Presumably, President Obamas decision on the steep reduction—even elimination of nuclear warheads—was the result of these various considerations e.g. shared concerns amongst the elites over the possible illegal and illicit spread of nuclear warheads. III. Relative Peace amidst Constant Threats of Nuclear Annihilation: Deterrence, Negotiations, and Idiosyncrasy Indeed, in reality, questions and discourses surrounding nuclear weapons and its delivery systems remain as elusive and fascinating as ever, both in its theoretical and practical terms. One of the difficult puzzles that the epistemic community of international relations and strategic studies has been trying to understand and explain is the fact that despite its imminent threats of destruction within the context of intense Cold War, no single nuclear weapon has been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. While this is surely a surprising, yet, welcomed situation, especially amongst non-nuclear weapons states, yet, it does not mean that the world is totally free from the fear and threats of global destruction caused by nuclear war. Arguably, this relative peaceful situation can be understood at least through three different prisms: first, the role of deterrence; second, diplomatic measures and negotiations; and, third, idiosyncrasy. Deterrence. In essence, a number of scholars and practitioners are convinced that nuclear capability has been playing an important role in deterring (external) threats.[17] Furthermore, nuclear deterrence provides strategic blanket in three specific terms: first, protection against attacks with nuclear weapons; second, protection against attacks with conventional forces; and, third, indefinable additional diplomatic clout.[18] Theoretically, some analysts of international relations and strategic studies believe that the relative peace is attainable mostly through effective deterrence, coercion, and all its derivative concepts such as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and Balance of Terror.[19] In his robust argument, Robert Jervis (1989) reiterated ‘the significance of the theory of the nuclear revolution: in a world of mutual second-strike nuclear capability (where an adversarys first strike cannot prevent a states retaliation), military victory in a total war is impossible.'[20] The handling of strategic nuclear weapons policy is also not without any idealistic consideration. In the hands of policy handlers, apart from the need to deter, another major consideration surrounding strategic nuclear policy is the moral and ethical dilemma that entail. For the US as a major nuclear weapons state, for instance, the dilemma is aptly captured by Robert E. Osgood (1988), who clearly stated the following: In the period since World War II, the United States has encountered moral and strategic issues concerning the management of force in peacetime that are unique in its historical experience and novel in the history of international politics. At the core of these issues lies a dilemma—namely, the moral (as well as ethical) and strategic predicament of being unable to pursue one course of action without incurring the disadvantage of another. It arises from the dependence of military security on nuclear weapons. This nuclear dilemma lurks in the background of every major military strategic choice and suffuses all major strategic debates. The history of US strategic thought can be largely be comprehended as the story of how Americans have tried to cope with this dilemma by rejecting, abolishing, or mitigating it.[21] Furthermore, he continued by defining precisely the dilemma the US (as arguably other nuclear weapons states) is facing in regard with its nuclear arsenal depository, as follows: The nuclear dilemma is simply an expression of the momentous fact that the security and peace of the United States and its major allies depend heavily on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, and on the fact that this deterrent, if used, would very probably lead to self-defeating destruction and, possibly, an ecological catastrophe for much of civilization.[22] In his critical analysis, Wilson (2008) however seriously questioned the role of deterrence in preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. His arguments rest on the assumption that the policy makers have so far misunderstood the true concept of deterrence. He maintained that that the logics of nuclear deterrence, as widely perceived by the policy-makers, were unwarranted simply because they either built on a fallacy of assumptions or were based on disproven facts.[23] Countering Kissingers arguments that nuclear attacks would likely to happen on major populous cities, as happened on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Wilson asserted that there has been no single solid evidence on the intention of the former USSR to attack U.S. major cities even at the height of nuclear tension during the Cold War. As he argued further, An examination of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows doubtful successes and proven failures. If the conventional wisdom is wrong—if nuclear weapons might not deter nuclear attacks, do not deter conventional attacks, and do not reliably provide diplomatic leverage—then the case for disarmament, nonproliferation and banning nuclear weapons is immeasurably strengthened.[24] In the post 9/11 tragedy, the nature and logic of asymmetric wars has added more complexity to the already difficult policy options.[25] Fear from the possibility of illicit transfer and/or nuclear acquisitions by the so-called ‘terrorist groups, it is very clear that the US and its allies have been undertaking all possible diplomatic initiatives and even military actions to deny these groups access to any nuclear materials.[26] Negotiations and Diplomatic Measure. It is also worth to mention the role of diplomacy and diplomatic efforts in ensuring countries do not resort to their nuclear arsenal to settle whatever disputes they may have with one another. In this regard, the role of negotiators in ensuring the commitments and compliance of all states—both nuclear and non-nuclear ones—to international code of conducts and norms of non-proliferation is also significant. To date, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains at the very helm of global endeavor to keep the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and at the same time, restraining states from diverting its peaceful nuclear program towards provocative and militaristic uses. Corollary to this is the most authoritative nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime—the NPT- which was concluded in 1968 and has entered into force since 5 March 1974. Consisting of a Preamble and 11 articles,[27] more often than not that the treaty is widely interpreted as â€Å"a three pillar system†, namely: non-proliferation; disarmament ; and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. [28] In operation, a safeguards system to verify compliance with the NPT is established under the auspices of the IAEA one of which is conducted through site inspections. As outlined in the Treaty, NPT seeks to promote cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including the use of nuclear energy and equal access to this technology for all States parties, and provide safeguards that prevent the diversion of fissile material for the development of nuclear weapons.[29] Idiosyncrasy. In contrast with the above analysis on the role of deterrence and diplomatic measures, a more recent study by Nina Tannenwald (2007) revealed a striking fact concerning the idiosyncratic factor of U.S. leaders regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald was able to dispute the widely accepted theory of deterrence as primary inhibitor to an open and global-scale nuclear war. Instead, she was in favor of what she calls a nuclear taboo, a widespread inhibition on using nuclear arsenals—which has arguably arisen in global politics. By analyzing four critical instances of wars where U.S. leaders considered using nuclear weapons (namely Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991), Tannenwald produced a rich and convincing explanation on how the nuclear taboo has successfully helped prevent the U.S. and other world leaders from resorting to these ultimate weapons of mass-destruction. [30] In other words, Tannenwald believed that there has been some moral ingredient within the policy makers in regard with the use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, from the leadership perspective and beliefs, Jacques E.C. Hymans (2006) convincingly demonstrates that leaders do play significant role in achieving nuclear capabilities.[31] Based on his findings on contending interests of leaders in the attainment of nuclear capabilities, he suggests three possible responses: first, a stricter international non-proliferation regime—controlling supply-demand side; second, nuclear abolition, in which the nuclear weapons states make much ‘more serious efforts towards disarmament and ‘resist the temptation to threaten nuclear attacks against non-nuclear weapons states, as they promised to do in Article VI and again at the NPT Review Conference in 2000; and, third, preventive military action/intervention against regimes whose leaders harbor nuclear weapons ambitions.[32] Apparently, those three responses are in combination taking place in todays world politics and international security. Despite their differences in mode of operation, all three prescriptions above do tell us common assumption that: nuclear weapons are highly attractive to many states; that nuclear weapons tend to proliferate. As argued by Hymans, ‘the ultimate solution to the proliferation puzzle lies in some sort of fundamental change to the international system, be it sovereignty-crashing inspections, universal disarmament, or a wholesale revision on the laws of war.'[33]This entails the need to change the way international law operates, which so far is seen as rather ineffective to ensure compliance. As radical it may sound, yet, it is surely rather difficult to be implemented on the ground. IV. Recent Major Development: A Fresher Outlook of Multilateral Negotiation? As one of the key nuclear weapons states, The U.S. has sheer diplomatic and military clout over the future of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the global scale. In this regard, it is important to note that any debate concerning the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is strategically important and critical. This has been truer especially since the new Obama Administration has expressed its commitments to pursue a deep and steep cut in its nuclear force, and to launch a major review of U.S. nuclear policy, which will hopefully be submitted to the Congress in February 2010. With its 2,200 operational strategic warheads (while the overall U.S. force to date is merely a fraction of one-fourth of its size a decade ago), yet, it is more capable to destroy an adversarys nuclear weapons before they can be used. In the realm of nuclear disarmament negotiations, the weight the U.S. diplomacy can throw to the success or failure of the negotiations is also visible. This was clearly shown, for instance, in President Obamas success to round commitments from the P-5 countries during last UNSC Summit on NPT on 24 September 2009, which unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009). Resolution 1887 itself spells out, inter-alia, the â€Å"calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations and fulfil their commitments under the Treaty† as well as refrain themselves from nuclear test explosion and sign the CTBT, and also exercise stricter measures to sensitive materials†[34]—as means to avoid nuclear warheads from falling into the terrorist group. The expected band-wagonning effect of the U.S. commitments, especially on the part of non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to NPT, will be prominent, thus, making the study of the Obama Administrations nuclear policy becomes more critical in our attempts to understand the dynamics of nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations. But, what is the real impact of President Obamas initiatives on the future nuclear disarmament multilateral negotiations? To begin with, the U.S.—like any other country, has its own strategic sense of security—and even vulnerability, as reflected in the contours of its proliferation policies of the past decade or so. Sense of Insecurity. The threat of terrorism is one that is getting more prominence since 9/11. But deep beneath its psyche, the U.S. Government(s) continue to assert the US nuclear strategy does not hinge any longer on being able to deter a single, comparably powerful, nuclear rival. It goes even further beyond that. For instance, the Bush administrations 2002 National Security Strategy embraced ‘pre-emptive attacks, against certain potential adversaries, rather than a strategy of deterrence, under the assumption that terrorist groups and even certain ‘rogue states cannot be deterred.'[35] Furthermore, the same Administration stated in its 2006 National Security Strategy that despite its recognition to address the issues of proliferation through diplomacy and in concert with its allies and partners, the ‘the place of pre-emption in our national security strategy remains the same.'[36] Departing from his predecessors position, in his illuminating speech in Prague, President Obama introduced a (new) calculus of US nuclear strategy. He outlined the intention of the U.S. to, among others, ‘aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), ‘seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons as means to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, and ‘strengthen the NPT as basis for cooperation.'[37] He further shared some initiatives for international cooperation. These include the efforts to strengthen the treaty and to need put resources and authority to strengthen international inspections, as well as the need to build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation including an international fuel bank. He also called for â€Å"real and immediate consequences† for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without cause—referring to the North Korea and Iran specifically.[38] President Obamas promise to fulfill his ‘world-that-is-free-from-nuclear-weapons vision indeed sparked optimism. Analyst like Tom Sauer (2009) even predicts that â€Å"the nuclear weapon states may opt sooner for nuclear elimination than generally expected, due to five factors: first, the danger of nuclear proliferation; second, the risk of nuclear terrorism; third, the nuclear taboo—as outlined earlier; fourth, the technological advancement of missile defense against nuclear arsenals, which reduced the ‘shock and awe capability of nuclear weapons; fifth, the increased importance of international laws.[39] While the optimism seems to be warranted, yet, it might be too little too soon for us to conclude that the age of nuclear proliferation is practically over. President Obamas promise will face a number of hurdles, from within and outside the U.S. Nuclear Rivalries. It will be immediately tested this year when the US and Russia resume haggling on an arms reduction pact and again meet at the crucial UN nuclear arms conference in May. Whether or not the American and Russian negotiators could agree on a successor pact to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1) to cut nuclear weapons would serve as the litmus test on the feasibility of President Obamas calls. START-1 was an initiative proposed by the late U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1982, and completed under the administrations of U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. As stipulated by the treaty, each country could deploy no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles — the single largest bilateral reductions in history.†[40] The concerns—and indeed stakes are now getting much heightened particularly since both Washington and Moscow missed their deadline in December to agree to ‘a new arms control treaty, which would have cut the worlds two largest nuclear arsenals by up to a third, though they vowed to generally abide by the old one while continuing negotiations. The good news is that the overall outline of the new treaty is apparent. At a meeting in Moscow in July 2009, Presidents Obama and Dmitry Medvedev narrowed the range for a cap on warheads to between 1,500 and 1,675, down from about 2,200, which each side now has. They are also expected to lower the ceiling on delivery vehicles intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-based missiles and strategic bombers to below 800, from 1,600. [41] It is widely believed that ‘a successor to START-1 would help restore relations between Moscow and Washington, which recently sank to a post-Cold War low due to many political and diplomatic upheavals as shown in the rift between the two countries over problems in Chechnya, Russian attacks on Georgia in August 2008, and so forth. In that sense, the new treaty should become ‘another milestone in disarmament and non-proliferation, taking the interaction between the US and Russia to a higher level and reaffirming their common goal of promoting mutual as well as global security.'[42] While the US and Russia are now still grappling over a few key differences (e.g. verification procedures) in their respective position concerning the common policy of nuclear weapons/warheads reduction, there are no guarantees that talks would yield a provisional accord. More fundamentally, the problems between these two largest and most important nuclear weapon states are more deeply rooted. Some within the U.S. strategic elites, particularly from the â€Å"republican camp,† argued that U.S. policymakers need to critically examine Russias views on nuclear weapons and doctrine. While successive U.S. Administrations have announced that Russia is no longer the enemy, Russia still considers the United States its â€Å"principal adversary,† despite President Barack Obamas attempts to â€Å"reset† bilateral relations. U.S. national leadership and arms control negotiators need to understand Russias nuclear doctrine and negotiating style as they are, not as the U.S. wants them to be.[43] In addition, Russia is not the only nuclear rival that the U.S. is facing. In the longer term, China, as dubbed by many analysts and observers, is likely to pose serious â€Å"challenges† to the status of the U.S. as the worlds dominant hyper-power. The rise of China as prominent nuclear power would eventually